You're about to let strangers run code on your computer to earn money. That's a fair thing to be nervous about. Here is exactly what a buyer can and cannot do — no hand-waving.
Buyer code runs inside an OS-level sandbox. It can read and write one folder — its own scratch space — and nothing else. We ran the six attacks a malicious buyer would try, from inside the sandbox (tested on a Mac):
| Attack we ran (Mac) | Result |
|---|---|
| Read your Documents folder | 🛡 Blocked |
| Steal SSH keys / saved passwords (Keychain) | 🛡 Blocked |
| Write a file to your Desktop | 🛡 Blocked |
| Read GridShare's own config (holds your API key) | 🛡 Blocked |
| List your home folder's contents | 🛡 Blocked |
| Reach another buyer's instance data | 🛡 Blocked |
The buyer can only touch one scratch folder created for that rental. Your personal data is invisible to them — they can't see it, copy it, damage it, or plant anything on your machine.
On a Mac it's macOS's built-in app sandbox (the same isolation technology macOS uses for App Store apps). Metal and MLX calls go straight to the GPU, with no container in between. On Linux/NVIDIA machines it's Docker container isolation. Either way the workload runs as a jailed process: it gets the CPU/GPU you're renting out, and nothing else.
…but jailed. Think of it like a locked room inside your house: they can use the workbench (GPU/CPU) we put in that room, but every door to the rest of the house is bolted. They never get your login, your shell, or your files.
Workloads need the internet to download models and datasets, so outbound traffic is allowed. The risk is a buyer abusing your connection, so our abuse monitor checks every 30 seconds, using only connection metadata (never your traffic contents):
Every kill is logged and the buyer's account is flagged. Repeat offenders are banned.
Sustained compute means heat and electricity, like running a game for a few hours.